Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy
Jennifer Damelio and Kelly Sorensen Bioethics, 2008 The gestational surrogate -and her economic and educational vulnerability in particular -is the focus of many of the most persistent worries about paid surrogacy. Those who employ her, and those who broker and organize her services, usually have an advantage over her in resources and information.
That asymmetry exposes her to the possibility of exploitation and abuse.
State laws across the U.S. are still ambivalent about paid surrogacy. Many states have no surrogacy laws at all, and there is no orthodoxy among those that do. States that explicitly address the gestational surrogate's vulnerability generally do so in a crude way.
Some make paid surrogacy contracts illegal, even though this may compromise women's autonomy; others simply nullify surrogacy contracts in disputes, as New Jersey did in the well-known Baby M case. Because of her likely financial circumstances, the New Jersey Supreme Court argued that paying a gestational surrogate may 'make her decision less voluntary'. 1 Candidate surrogates tend to have significantly lower incomes than their employers, and so are more subject to coercion in such circumstances; for this reason, and also from concerns about the best interests of children, the Court determined that the surrogacy contract in the Baby M case was invalid.
Other writers advocate making paid surrogacy explicitly legal, arguing that among a woman's reproductive rights should be the freedom to enter into contracts that pay for gestational labor. But even those who occupy this position worry about the gestational surrogate's vulnerability. One answer is to ensure that the surrogate who changes her mind and wants to keep the resulting child may do so. Modeled after adoption statutes with a similar opt-out clause, this approach leaves an important sort of power and autonomy in the hands of the surrogate.
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We want to suggest a new and additional answer to these worries -one that both protects the gestational surrogate and enhances her autonomy. We propose that states that allow paid surrogacy should require, as a minimum necessary requirement for the contract to be legal, that the surrogate participate in a short class on contract pregnancy. The content of this class, which we will discuss more below, would include information about the experience of other paid surrogates, what can and cannot legally be required of surrogates, and alternative forms of employment. The class will improve the surrogate's opportunity to make an autonomous decision and guard her right to make choices about reproduction and her body. Policies of this sort, sometimes called 'soft law ', 3 require an individual to be well-informed before pursuing activities that include some important risk. We will argue that a soft law policy in the case of paid surrogacy addresses central concerns about the gestational surrogate's vulnerability. A legal ban forbids too much, and bald legal permission allows too much; but a soft law educational requirement strikes the right balance. A soft law approach would also enhance surrogate autonomy in place where surrogacy is already legal.
I. Concerns about Paid Surrogacy
We will begin by examining concerns about paid surrogacy that focus in some way on the surrogate's vulnerability. Some of the arguments can be answered sufficiently, as we will show, but others will persist. The legal solution we propose offers some new answers to the remaining concerns.
We will need some terms for the people involved in the contract. First, the 'contracting couple' is the couple who, in an attempt to have a child, wishes to employ a surrogate. 4 In most cases, they will become the legal parents of the child after its birth. The woman who enters an agreement with the contracting couple to carry a child in her womb is the 'gestational surrogate', 'surrogate 3 The term was originally used in the context of international law for codes which have little or no binding force. Here we use it as a term for binding, enforceable laws that mandate some performance or activity in order for one to obtain a certain legal permission. We describe soft law more below.
mother', or 'surrogate' -terms we will use interchangeably. There is some concern that the term 'surrogate' is prejudiced against her, since it already invites the view that she occupies a less important role in the creation of the child than the contracting couple. We share this concern about the term, but it has become relatively standard, and alternative terms also have problems.
The child may have a genetic tie to the gestational surrogate; her egg could be fertilized with the sperm of the contracting father. It could also happen that the surrogate shares no genes with the child she carries; a fertilized egg could be implanted into her womb. Some discussions distinguish the two situations with different terms for the surrogate (for example, 'traditional surrogate' and 'gestational surrogate' respectively). 5 In the arguments we will present, it does not make a difference which of the two situations the surrogate is in, so we will not use terms that reflect the distinction.
(1) Surrogacy contracts require a woman to perform nine months of gestational labor and then sever all ties to the child almost immediately after its birth. Some see surrogacy as a more subtle form of prostitution; the woman in effect sells her womb and relinquishes control of her body. Prostitution is generally not legal in the United States, and since surrogacy seems to be along the same lines, the worry goes, it should not be legal either. The argument is that a woman should not be able to enter into a contract in which she sells her body under these circumstances. 6 Call this the 'prostitution argument'.
The prostitution argument is sensitive in some ways to the gestational surrogate's vulnerability, but it's somewhat off target. For instance, prostitution and surrogacy have importantly different objectives. Prostitution consists in the selling of women's bodies for sexual satisfaction; but the aim of surrogacy is to bring a child into the world. Even though both are services performed for money, the analogy is not solid -it is hard to compare prostitution and surrogacy when their purposes are so different. Another objection to the prostitution argument is that people are allowed to 'sell their bodies' in a broad variety of other ways. In the U.S., people can sell eggs and sperm, plasma, hair, and they can accept jobs that are known to compromise their physical health. Coal workers who know that mining poses serious health risks -they know they are potentially shortening their lives by accepting the job -are still allowed to make that decision. There is no reason to think that surrogacy is more like prostitution, an illegal form of 'bodyselling', than it is like egg-selling, or any of the other legal forms of 'bodyselling'.
Another objection to the argument about 'body-selling' is that surrogacy contracts do not actually turn women's bodies into objects of sale. There is a difference between 'compensating a woman for her services, and paying a woman (2) A related concern is that paid surrogacy is 'baby-selling'. Like the prostitution argument, which argues against the sale of women's bodies, the babyselling argument contends that surrogacy contracts turn children into objects of sale, which devalues their lives, and maybe broader human life as well.
Commodification of this sort, the argument says, is an attack on human dignity: the child's, but also the surrogate's, the contracting couple's, and everyone else's, too.
Like the gestational surrogate, children are vulnerable in surrogacy arrangements, and we agree that their interests should be carefully protected, although that is not our primary focus here. We also agree that there are legitimate concerns about exposing gestation to marketplace norms. But there are reasons to think that the baby-selling argument misfires. First, just as in our objections to the last argument, the purpose of surrogacy is crucial. The contracting couple want to be parents -they are not paying money to exploit the child or to make a profit from a resale. Second, in most cases the contracting father has supplied the sperm to create the child. He is genetically the father, so it seems odd to say he is buying his own child. Third, contracts that ensure that the surrogate can change her mind and keep the baby -the opt-out clause that we mentioned above -help preserve the sense that she is selling a service, not a child. Contracts without an opt-out clause are more easily interpreted as selling a product or outcome instead of a process.
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Most remaining objections about baby selling should be directed at surrogacy brokers, rather than the gestational surrogate or the contracting couple, both of whom stand in some danger of being exploited by these brokers. And in any case, worries about third parties profiting from the contract are already present in many adoption arrangements.
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(3) Even if these first two arguments are answered, it's true that compensation is an important incentive for many gestational surrogates. Kelly
Oliver only mildly overstates the situation when she says that 'very few women, if any, would perform surrogacy services without payment'. 13 That surrogacy arrangements would significantly diminish if paid surrogacy were illegal is itself a 11 Although our concern in this paper is with the surrogate herself, issues about child welfare are deservedly the focus of much work on surrogacy. We don't presume to answer all the concerns about the exploitation, commodification, and well-being of the child. sign that there is something wrong with the practice. Or so says the 'compensation argument'.
If the worry is that economic factors wrongfully force women into entering these contracts, it is not clear that women are forced in this way. Many people would not do their jobs if they were not paid, not just surrogate mothers.
Even people who love their work may do something else if they weren't getting paid, simply because they need to earn a living somehow. So the fact that most surrogates want to be compensated for their services is not enough to show paid surrogacy should be illegal.
(4) Compensation aside, some think paid surrogacy should be illegal because the nature of the work is particularly unrelenting: the surrogate mother is 'never off-duty'. 14 She is under contract for perpetual service, twenty-four hours a day, and 'most people do not perform their service twenty-four hours a day, unless they are slaves'. It's also worth noting that surrogates, actors, and doctors still retain broad freedom about what they do, even when they are not fully off-duty. Surrogates, for instance, can hold other jobs and care for their existing children.
(5) The previous arguments don't exhaust concerns about exposing gestation to the marketplace. She is neither a prostitute nor a baby-seller, and she is not a slave; but some argue that the gestational surrogate is mistreated by the very nature of paid surrogacy arrangements. On the 'mistreatment argument', paid surrogacy turns women's bodies into commodities and means of production.
'In general, within the surrogacy arrangement, the "surrogate" is treated as a machine whose services can be exchanged for money. herself to these restrictions, she does not have to sign the contract. Even more traditional jobs restrict people's behavior in one way or another.
It is true that the surrogate is generally not on an equal footing with the contracting couple. She is usually less economically well off and less educated then the couple, 18 and so she enters surrogacy arrangements more vulnerable to mistreatment than the contracting couple. But the stronger form of the mistreatment argument overstates both the level and risk of damage to the surrogate.
(6) Some argue that surrogacy makes unfair predictive demands on women. During gestation, it is common for a woman to develop strong feelings towards the fetus growing in her womb. Contracts that demand that she harbor these feelings and then give up the child she has grown attached to are unreasonable. Surrogacy asks a woman to decide how she will feel towards a child she carries but doesn't intend to keep; but the extent and kind of connection she will feel is too difficult to predict. It's wrong, the 'demanding prediction argument' says, to require that she commit to a process whose effect on her is in principle impossible to foresee.
To address this particular sort of surrogate vulnerability, many laws and brokers require her to have given birth to another child before being allowed to enter into a surrogacy contract. But this provision may not be enough to answer the worry -when she was pregnant before she did not carry the fetus with the expectation of having to give it up after birth.
18 See the data presented in argument seven below. 
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(7) Some think surrogacy contracts are unfair to women for a different reason: because women enter into these contracts under coercion. The thought is that the surrogate's choice process is burdened by circumstances that make it very difficult to resist agreeing to something she does not really want to do. Call thisa more subtle relative of the compensation argument above -the 'coercion argument'.
On the simplest view of coercion, this argument doesn't make sense.
Paradigmatic cases of coercion involve limiting or removing an option, but surrogacy contracts actually present women with an additional option. So how can it be that they are coerced into these contracts, when they have in fact gained another choice? One answer is that the simple view of coercion isn't correct: a There is another type of circumstance in which options can be made very costly -not by a demand enforced by a threat as in the walker and the gunman situation, but through an offer. These 'coercive offers' are made to a target in some vulnerable situation such that she may believe that she cannot act in another way. Like the gunman's threat, these are offers that cannot be refused without great cost. On a simple view of coercion, offers would always increase freedom:
the target is presented with a new option that she did not have before, and she does not lose any options that she had before; but certain cases make this simple view untenable.
Consider, for instance, the case of the lecherous millionaire. 'B's child will die unless she receives expensive surgery…. A, a millionaire, proposes to pay for the surgery if B will agree to become his mistress.' 21 In this example, B is presented with a new option; she can become A's mistress and acquire the means to pay for the surgery that will save her child's life. However, from B's point of view, there is seemingly no choice: either she sleeps with the millionaire, or her child dies. So A has made B's option of choosing not to be his mistress extremely costly. She can refuse the offer -that choice is technically open to her -but the cost severely limits its appeal. B's inability to pay for life-saving surgery for her child puts her in a position such that A's offer seemingly can't be refused. A put B into a situation comparable to that of the walker confronted by the gunman.
The walker was coerced into giving the gunman his wallet because the gunman made the cost of noncompliance too high. The walker could choose not to comply with the gunman, but this option is so unappealing that it can be said he was coerced into giving up his wallet. B's situation is analogous: the cost of her 'non-compliance' with A's offer is so high that we are justified in thinking she was coerced.
Of particular importance is that B is in a position where she is very vulnerable to A's offer. We wouldn't be concerned about B's options if she did not have a child who would die without an expensive operation, or if B had other reasonable means to raise the money. Therefore, an important factor in the idea of coercive offers is the vulnerability of the party being coerced.
In a similar way, some argue that paid surrogacy is a new but coercive option for many women. There are women who may feel that there is no other way for them to make money. Perhaps being a surrogate mother is not an attractive idea to them, but they feel that their other options are even more unappealing. More than just unappealing, these other options are so costly that the women cannot seriously consider them. By entering into a surrogacy contract, a mother who already has children can make a comparatively good amount of money and be able to stay at home with her other children while she works. In this way, legal surrogacy contracts, although expanding numerically their options, seem to coerce women into making a choice they do not prefer, yet cannot refuse because the price of refusal is too high.
One response to the coercion argument is that some women enjoy being pregnant; whatever their economic situation, surrogacy may not be a coercive offer for them. 22 A second response is this: most surrogates may not be economically vulnerable enough for paid surrogacy to count as a coercive option. All of these arguments concern, directly or indirectly, the vulnerability of the surrogate. We have shown that some fail in straightforward ways -in particular, the (1) prostitution, (2) baby-selling, (3) compensation, and (4) never off-duty arguments. But the (5) mistreatment, (6) demanding prediction, and (7) coercion arguments all still carry important weight. The risk to the surrogate of exploitation and abuse is not as severe as these arguments claim, but they do show that there is still plenty to worry about.
One response to the real vulnerability that these last arguments expose is to make surrogacy contracts illegal. And indeed some states have done so, most often because of concerns about children, but also to protect candidate surrogates, our focus here. But banning paid surrogacy buys protection at a very high cost: it deprives women of a deeply personal decision. Most generally think people should be free to make choices that concern their own lives, and that the choices relevant to the most intimate parts of their lives -what they think and believe, is (at least in part) genetically theirs, or at the very least the ability to initiate a pregnancy. The gestational surrogate also gains freedom and power: a new opportunity for paid labor, and the experience of playing a crucial role in bringing new life into the world, without all the antecedent costs of child-raising.
So the dilemma is clear: the surrogate is vulnerable in important ways, but autonomy prevents a ban, and even positively supports the enhanced choice that surrogacy contracts make possible. If surrogacy contracts are made illegal, women are wronged. However, we saw earlier some unanswered concerns that surrogacy contracts themselves wrong women -by allowing them, the law seems to be failing to protect women in important ways. We want to argue that there is an important and untapped legal tool that, short of a ban, addresses the most important vulnerability arguments. We turn to that proposal now.
II. A 'Soft Law' Solution
At present, the fifty U.S. states have varying laws (or no direct laws at all) regarding surrogacy. Six states allow individuals and couples to enter into surrogacy contracts, and ten prohibit them in all or some instances. exception these laws are too crude. What they miss is a particular form of 'soft law'.
'Soft law' is that part of law concerned not with crimes and torts, but instead permissions. Soft law mandates performances or activities that must occur before some sort of status change -performances and activities designed to protect some substantive state interest, such as public safety. Driver's license tests, marriage license procedures, and medical license procedures are all soft law.
Sometimes soft law protects others (medical licenses); sometimes it protects the person seeking the status change as well: the driver's license process certainly protects the driver, and in principle the marriage license process can protect not just possible offspring from disease, but also the couple from unknown health conditions and factual misrepresentation. Protection of the vulnerable from harm is the most common justification of soft law.
Consider another, less familiar example of soft law. In the state of Connecticut, any couple with a child/children under the age of eighteen that seeks a divorce is required by the state to attend 'Parenting Education Classes'. 28 These classes, a total of six hours in length, are intended to educate parents about the effects of divorce on children. They also teach dispute resolution and offer advice on how to deal with the upcoming new family circumstances. All of this is intended to reduce a negative effect of divorce: that which it has on children who must adapt to a new living situation. Connecticut is not the only state to carry these requirements for divorcing parents. Missouri's 'Focus on Kids' program has similar rules and aims. forth. 30 The aim in all of this is to decrease the surrogate's vulnerability -to help her be an informed, deliberate choice maker. being to whom they are either partly or not at all genetically related; they are the authorities on the sort of attachment that gestational surrogates come to feel.
Candidate surrogates may have gestated their own children before, but this does not mean they will be able to accurately predict how they will feel in a surrogacy arrangement. By hearing the experiences of others, their prediction will be better grounded and more cautious.
A third basic element of the class is information about other forms of employment. The 'coercion argument' (argument seven above) suggested that even though paid surrogacy presents some women with a new opportunity, their socioeconomic circumstances may make it an encumbered, problematic her talk first hand with other women who may have, or once have had, the same concerns as she does. If a surrogate mother has support, and is able to talk to other people who have gone through or are going through the same experiences, it will make the process easier on her.
Many of the details about the course can be left to the discretion of individual states, but we argue for the following additional structural elements.
First, this should be a multi-session instead of a single-session course. Retention will be higher if there are multiple sessions, and the (modest) time period between sessions will give the candidate surrogate a chance to reflect on her choice and bring her own questions back to the group.
Next, the total class time need not be long -six to eight hours of instruction and dialogue should be sufficient. But at least two of these hours should consist of a one-on-one meeting between the candidate surrogate and a counselor. The counselor can help the woman be reflective about the reasons for which she is entering the contract. And time alone with each potential surrogate will allow the counselor to address specific concerns. Without being in front of a large group of people or worrying about time constraints, the candidate surrogate is more likely to voice her own independent questions and concerns.
A third issue concerns the cost of the classes. There are four obvious candidate payers here: (1) the state, (2) one of the contracting parties' health insurance plans, (3) the potential surrogate, or (4) the contracting couple.
Because the course will not be cheap to run (it involves a paid instructor as well as someone qualified to provide one-on-one counseling), and because surrogacy is not a medically necessity (and so health insurance does not usually cover any fees related to the contract and procedure), it is difficult to justify obtaining the funds from either of the first two sources. Also, because the surrogate is most often economically not well-off, it is unfair to ask her to pay for the class. So the best option seems to be to include it in the costs a contracting couple will have to pay for the entire surrogacy process. It is normal that a contracting couple foot the bill for the medical expenses, maternity clothes, and other pregnancy-related costs incurred by the surrogate. It seems, then, most natural that the contracting couple subsidize the course as well.
Fourth, a required separate class session for the contracting couple may be important as well. They too can benefit from hearing from former participants in surrogacy contracts, both so that their own expectations are realistic, and because the more sympathy and understanding they have for the experiences of gestating surrogates, the less vulnerable the surrogate herself.
Finally, a candidate surrogate need only complete the program once, not every time she wants to enter a contact. Childcare should be provided for class members -after all, some women choose surrogacy exactly because it allows them to work without being away from their children.
It's important to emphasize that the surrogacy course is not intended to steer women away from surrogacy. Potential surrogates should be assured that the training and counseling is to help them, not hinder them. In order to present the sort of information described above as neutrally and objectively as possible, care must go into choosing educators and counselors. These class leaders should be familiar with surrogacy law and the surrogacy experience, or at the very least be able to marshal presenters who are. It is important that they announce themselves as advocates for the women in the program. They are not trying to scare or to prohibit candidate surrogates from making their own decisions. The counselors and educators, rather, are working as proponents of the surrogate; they are trying to create a favorable and fair environment for the contracts to take place. Upon completing the class, some may indeed decide not to become surrogates. 32 Those who do will be able to make a more reflective personal decision.
This last point -that surrogacy courses are intended and structured to enhance, not restrict, the autonomy of the surrogate -is crucial. It distinguishes our approach from other soft law approaches that, either explicitly or as revealed by the shape of the policy, simply attempt to discourage some behavior. For instance, a state law that requires women seeking an abortion to first view pictures of the remains of aborted fetuses is unlikely to be aimed at enhancing their autonomy. Soft law policies of the sort we defend here do exact costs (in time, energy, and other resources), and any benefits that don't accrue to those who pay these costs, or any moral constraints that asymmetrically handicap them, demand special justification. Our proposal meets this test in a way that other soft law approaches often do not: enhancing the candidate surrogate's autonomy is both the explicit and structural aim of the surrogacy classes.
And this proposal offers a way out of the dilemma that confronted us earlier -ban paid surrogacy, or respect a surrogate's autonomy to expose herself to possible exploitation and abuse. A ban wrongs women, because choices about what one does with one's body are deeply personal and crucial; and legalizing crude paid surrogacy wrongs women, because of the asymmetric vulnerability of 32 If they do decide against paid surrogacy, the Baby M case suggests that both the candidate surrogate and the contracting couple will be better off -and fewer children will face the sort of parental limbo that Baby M herself faced.
